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The first SMU Law Review survey of Texas school law appears in a year
when the Texas Legislature dramatically trimmed the size and transformed
the scope of the laws governing public education. The most noteworthy
changes in the survey period1 occurred in the overhaul of the Texas
Education Code by the passage of Senate Bill 1.
I. INTRODUCTION
HE most significant school law opinion issued in the survey period
cleared the way for the most significant legislative changes in
school law in fifty years.2 The Legislature's court-ordered struggle
with school finance had consumed three regular and three special ses-
sions, eclipsing other school law issues.3 In January 1995, the Texas
1. October 1, 1994 through September 30, 1995.
2. See Foundation School Program Act, 51st Leg., R.S. 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 625; Act
of June 8, 1949 51st Leg.; R.S. 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 647 (Gilmer-Aikin Bills). Like the
authors of Senate Bill 1, Sen. Ratliff and Rep. Sadler, the legislators who carried significant
school reform in the late 1940s were from East Texas.
3. On June 1, 1987, State District Judge Harley Clark ruled that the school finance
system was unconstitutional. The Third Court of Appeals reversed and rendered, 761
S.W.2d 859, and the Texas Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the trial court judgment
as modified, ordering the Legislature to overhaul the system by May 1, 1990, Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989) [Edgewood 1]. The Texas
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Supreme Court in Edgewood Independent School District v. Meno finally
upheld the constitutionality of a school finance plan. 4 The Legislature,
for the first time in years, had the leisure to consider school law issues
other than finance.
In fact, the Legislature had no choice; it had to put in place a new Texas
Education Code by September 1, 1995. Senate Bill 7, which set up the
constitutional school finance system, also laid the groundwork for mas-
sive reforms by repealing most of Titles 1 and 2 of the Education Code
and abolishing the state education agency effective September 1, 1995.
Ironically, the Legislature, after years of acting under school finance
court orders threatening to close the schools, now faced its own "act-or-
else" mandate to force legislative action and consensus before a set dead-
line. Senate Bill 7 also directed a Select Committee to study the workings
of the education agency and instructed the commissioner of education to
submit a proposed revision of the Education Code in the summer of
1994. 5 At the same time, education reform became a key issue in a
heated governor's race. During and after the election, the winner,
George W. Bush, focused on reducing the state's education bureaucracy;
increasing local control through means such as charter schools and home-
rule school districts; emphasizing a back-to-basics curriculum; maintain-
ing a stringent accountability system; and creating safe schools. With
strong leaders in the Senate and House, Lt. Gov. Bob Bullock and
Speaker Pete Laney, major reform was about to begin.
On February 14, 1995, State Senator Bill Ratliff, chairman of the Sen-
ate Education Committee and co-chairman of the Select Committee, filed
Senate Bill 1, which at 1,088 pages weighed in as the largest substantive
bill in Texas history.6 Despite its size, the bill as enacted reduced the size
of the public Education Code by one-third.7
Senate Bill 1 took a three-part approach to deregulation that focused
primarily on improving education. First, Senate Bill 1 trimmed the code
of unnecessary mandates and baggage that detracted from education.
Second, it placed authority at the proper level, devolving substantial
Supreme Court subsequently held other legislative attempts unconstitutional. Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491,498 (Tex. 1991) [Edgewood 11; Carrollton-Farm-
ers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 524 (Tex. 1992)
[Edgewood III]. On Jan. 30, 1995, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the school
finance plan enacted in Senate Bill 7. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 893 S.W.2d
450, 459 (Tex. 1995) [Edgewood IV].
4. Edgewood IV, 893 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1995). For more on Edgewood IV, see infra
Part VIII.
5. See FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CENTRAL
EDUCATION AGENCY, Dec. 1994; LIONEL R. MENO, TEXAS EDUCATION CODE PROPOSED
REVISION, July 1994. See also Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 347, §§ 7.11, 8.33-8.35.
6. Senate Bill 1 when filed was 1,088 pages and when passed to engrossment by the
Senate was 1,209 pages. Much of the rewrite was done by Sen. Ratliff on his laptop com-
puter. The recodification bill's size was due largely to its complete reorganization of the
code into a logical order.
7. Titles 1 and 2, Texas Education Code, were reduced in size by approximately one-
third according to a computer word count comparison between the old and new law.
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power to the local level.8 In this system, accountability follows authority.
The state sets standards and decides what students, at a minimum, must
learn. Local educators, schools, and districts are given the authority to
determine how best to achieve those goals-and are held accountable for
the results.9 Third, Senate Bill 1 let local citizens and governing bodies
who want more flexibility and local control choose a charter arrangement
that further frees the district, campus, or program from state control.
Thus, a local district or school can perform to the state-set minimum with-
out state law encumbering it in excess regulation. This approach ensures
that the education system focuses on results.
II. GOVERNANCE
A. STATE
Three levels of governance control Texas public education: state, re-
gional, and local. At the state level, under Senate Bill 1, the Texas Edu-
cation Agency ("TEA") consists of the commissioner of education and
the agency staff, but it no longer includes the fifteen-member elected
State Board of Education ("SBOE"), which under prior law was the
agency's policy- and rule-making component.10 The commissioner, who
was formerly the executive officer of the SBOE," is now the TEA's exec-
utive officer and the SBOE's executive secretary. 12
Accountability starts at the top with greater gubernatorial power. Edu-
cation, in most recent gubernatorial elections, has been a key issue. If
voters expect that a governor, when elected, will carry out campaign
promises on education, then the governor should have the power to do
so. Therefore, the commissioner is now directly accountable to the gover-
nor. The governor can appoint and remove the commissioner with the
advice and consent of the Senate; previously, such action required SBOE
involvement.' 3 The governor also fills SBOE vacancies 14 and appoints
members of and fills vacancies on the newly created State Board for Edu-
8. The Select Committee used a table that listed all key players in the education
system, from the parent to the Legislature, and listed hundreds of educational functions,
such as ensuring student attendance, determining time on task, and setting class sizes. The
committee then attempted to match the educational function with the appropriate actor.
9. For more discussion of this educational philosophy, see T. Luce, Now OR NEVER:
How WE CAN SAVE OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 43 (1995).
10. Compare TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.002 (Vernon 1996) with id. § 11.01 (Vernon
1991). See Amarillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 854 S.W.2d 950, 956 (Tex. App.-Austin
1993, writ denied). Senate Bill 1 changed "Central Education Agency" to its more com-
mon moniker, "Texas Education Agency."
11. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.25(a) k 11.52(a) (Vernon 1991).
12. Id. § 7.055(a)(2) (Vernon 1996).
13. Id. § 7.051. Previously, the SBOE nominated a candidate and the governor either
could reject the person or could appoint the person with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Id. § 11.51(a) (Vernon 1991).
14. SBOE vacancies are filled by the governor, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, rather than by the remaining board members. Compare id. § 7.104 (Vernon 1996)





Although Senate Bill 1 gave the governor more power, it diminished
the power of state government as a whole, allowing greater freedom at
the local level. Throughout the code, the state's powers are defined and
limited. 16 For example, prior law required that "the State Board of Edu-
cation shall take actions necessary to implement legislative policy for the
public school system of the state. '17 Senate Bill 1 replaced this broad
power-which the SBOE used to make rules in the absence of express
authority-with specifically defined authority.18 If a state entity has
power to make rules in a particular area, the statute will expressly grant
that power to that entity. Thus, a multitude of rules in the Texas Admin-
istrative Code no longer have any statutory basis and are no longer good
law.19 Gone, for example, is the rule that prohibited school districts from
holding back a child more than twice between kindergarten and the
eighth grade.20 This more limited power at the state level allows author-
ity and accountability at the local level.
2. Appeals
In addition to limiting state rulemaking, Senate Bill 1 restricts the
state's role in appeals. Under prior law, the commissioner had jurisdic-
tion over cases (such as federal claims) for which the commissioner could
not grant complete relief.21 The commissioner also heard disputes over
local school board policies such as cheerleader tryouts.2 2 The new scope
of appeals is limited to written grievances based on: (1) Titles 1 and 2 of
the Education Code and rules adopted under those titles; (2) a school
board's actions or decisions that violate a provision of Titles 1 or 2 or
rules adopted under those titles; and (3) a school board's actions or deci-
sions that violate a written employment contract between the district and
its employee, provided the violation causes or would cause the employee
monetary harm.23 Under the latter two bases, Senate Bill 1 limits the
review given a school board's action or decision. Previously, for most
15. Id. §§ 21.033 & 21.034 (Vernon 1996).
16. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.003 (Vernon 1996).
17. Id. § 11.24(a) (Vernon 1991).
18. Id. § 7.102(a) (Vernon 1996); see Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 444
(Tex. 1994); Spring Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Dillon, 683 S.W.2d 832, 839-40 (Tex. App.-Austin
1994, no writ) ("state-level school authorities have or claim discretionary power in numer-
ous matters" that pertain to local school operation, management, and government).
19. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.102(f) (Vernon 1996).
20. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 75.1950) (West 1995); see Gregory Curtis, What Does
'Jolt' Mean?, TEX. MONTHLY, Dec. 1995.
21. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.13 (Vernon 1991); see Texas Educ. Agency v.
Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 S.W.2d 88, 90-91 (Tex. 1992).
22. See, e.g., Julia Kirchoff v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., Commissioner Decision No.
274-R5-689 (June 24, 1991).
23. This does not include a case (e.g., termination, suspension, or term contract nonre-
newal) to which appeals to the commissioner may be had under Subchapter G, Chapter 21.
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appeals the school board held a hearing and then the commissioner on
appeal held a second hearing; 24 now the commissioner will review the
record developed at the district level under a substantial evidence stan-
dard of review.25 The local record must include, at a minimum, an audi-
ble electronic recording or written transcript of all oral testimony or
argument. 26 Both the grievant and the district would be well advised to
at least tape record the local proceedings and to clearly identify each
speaker on that recording.27 It also would be instructive to review the
Administrative Procedure Act requirement for a record in a contested
case.
28
Under this section, appeal may be had to Travis County district court if
a person is aggrieved by the commissioner's decision or an action of the
"agency" (including the commissioner or agency staff but no longer in-
cluding the State Board of Education, as under prior law, or the new
State Board for Educator Certification). 29 Rules of the SBOE or SBEC,
however, are "school laws of this state," and a person may appeal to the
commissioner if the person is aggrieved by the SBOE or SBEC rules or
by a school board's actions or decision that violate them.30
3. Waivers
Although prior law set up a fairly rigid legal structure, it gained some
flexibility in 1990 when the Education Code was amended to allow the
commissioner to waive many state laws and rules. 31 Waivers inject com-
mon sense into the process by letting the state's educational leader de-
cide, on a case-by-case basis, whether a state restriction unduly frustrates
a district's or school's educational objectives. In recent years, the com-
missioner granted waivers to allow students to be exempted from final
examinations, allow longer grading periods, allow alternative grading
methods, and allow block scheduling. 32 The laws necessitating these
waivers are no longer in the code or have been modified to allow more
flexibility.33 Waivers, in a sense, led the way in reforming the Education
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057(e)(1) (Vernon 1996). It also does not include a case to
which a more specific exclusion applies. See, e.g., id. § 21.103(a).
24. Id. § 11.13(b) (Vernon 1991).
25. Id. § 7.057(c) (Vernon 1996); see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174 (Vernon
Supp. 1996) (substantial evidence review under Administrative Procedures Act).
26. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057(f)(1) (Vernon 1996).
27. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 551.023 (Vernon 1994).
28. Id. § 2001.060.
29. Compare TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057(d) (Vernon 1996) with id. §§ 11.13(c) &
11.01 (Vernon 1991). Actions or decisions of SBOE or SBEC may still be appealed to
Travis County District Court under the Administrative Procedures Act. TEX. Gov'T CODE
ANN. § 2001.176(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
30. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057(a), (e) (Vernon 1996).
31. Id. § 11.273 (Vernon Supp. 1995); id. § 7.056 (Vernon 1996).
32. See TEA Waiver Report (1994); see also Memorandum from Ellen Williams to
Rep. Sadler (Oct. 20, 1994) (on file with author).
33. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.723 (Vernon 1987) (prohibiting students from
being exempted from final examinations that other students are required to take). Com-
pare id. § 21.722 (Vernon 1987) (requiring maximum six-week grading period) with id.
[Vol. 49
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Code, because they made apparent many constraints that bound educa-
tional innovations. Legislators in the future will likely look at waiver re-
quests and denials for future legislation, especially because Senate Bill 1
sets a thirty-day deadline for the commissioner to act and requires the
commissioner to object to a waiver application in writing.34 Senate Bill 1
also defined more concretely those laws and rules the commissioner can-
not waive 35 and added the accountability system to the list of unwaive-
able laws and rules.36
B. REGIONAL
The state's twenty regional service centers provide training and assist-
ance to most districts in Texas. The Select Committee recommended that
all state-supported training and assistance activities be transferred from
the TEA to the regional centers and that the centers should receive lim-
ited state funding to give them the capacity to offer services. The com-
mittee also recommended that the centers should be forced to compete
with other vendors of training and assistance to actually sell those serv-
ices to districts and campuses.37 Senate Bill 1, following those recom-
mendations, moves TEA-provided training and assistance services to
service centers and emphasizes that the centers should provide service,
not regulation.3 8 In addition, Senate Bill 1 made service center funding
more market oriented and allowed districts and campuses to purchase
services from any service center in the state.39 This chapter of the code is
repealed effective August 31, 1997 to allow the commissioner to develop
the most efficient, market-driven system for providing training and assist-
ance to school districts.40
C. LOCAL-SCHOOL DISTRICTS
1. Types
Most districts in Texas are organized as "independent school districts."
Eight chapters of the prior Education Code were devoted to school dis-
tricts or county systems that were organized in a different manner;41
§ 28.022(a)(2) (Vernon 1996) (requiring maximum 12-week grading period); compare id.
§ 21.721 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (established criteria in grading and advancement policy) with
id. § 28.021(a) (Vernon 1996) (requiring promotion be based on academic achievement or
demonstrated proficiency in subject matter or grade level); compare id. § 13.902 (Vernon
1991) (requiring 45-minute teacher planning and preparation time within each 7-hour
school day) with id. § 21.404 (Vernon 1996) (requiring 450 minutes of classroom teacher
planning and preparation within each two-week period).
34. Id. § 7.056(c) (Vernon 1996).
35. Compare id. § 7.056(e), (f) with id. § 11.273(e), (h) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
36. Id. § 7.056(e)(3)(B) (Vernon 1996).
37. See SELEcr COMMITrEE, supra note 5, at 13-14.
38. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8.054 (Vernon 1996).
39. Id. § 8.002(b).
40. See Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, § 59.
41. These were former chs. 17 (county administration), 18 (countywide equalization
fund or county unit system of equalization taxation), 22 (common school districts), 24 (mu-
nicipal school districts), 25 (rural high school districts), 26 (rehabilitation districts for hand-
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those chapters are no longer in the code. Several of the chapters were
obsolete because those types of districts had not existed in many years. A
savings clause lets the remaining districts or county systems continue to
operate under the former chapter and any state law that applies generally
to school districts, if that law does not conflict with the former chapter.
42
A common school district or municipal school district may become an
independent school district, following procedures contained in the prior
law.4
3
2. Creation, Detachment and Annexation, and Consolidation
Senate Bill 1 substantially changed provisions on creating a new school
district by detaching territory. Previously the territory had to come from
two or more school districts.44 The new law lets a new district break away
from a single district or from more than one district.45 The law retains
the requirement that new and old districts be not less than nine square
miles each and adds a new requirement that the new and old districts
must have a minimum of 8,000 students each, which legislators said was
an optimum size for districts.46 To quell fears that the changes were an
attempt to break up large districts such as the Houston Independent
School District, legislators also added a requirement of twenty-five per-
cent turnout for the breakaway election to be effective. 47
The bill also made minor changes in procedures for detachment and
annexation and for consolidation, generally strengthening the board of
trustees' role. If both boards of trustees disapprove a petition to detach
territory from one school district and annex it to another school district,
that decision can no longer be appealed to the commissioner. Appeal is
available only if both school boards disagree.48 For uninhabited land to
be detached and annexed, a petition need only be signed by a majority of
landowners, instead of the previous implied requirement that the petition
be signed by all landowners. 49 In consolidations of two or more school
districts, the board of trustees may now initiate consolidation by resolu-
tion.50 And the board of trustees, rather than the county judge, is now
icapped persons), 27 (county industrial training school districts), and 28 (countywide
vocational school district and tax).
42. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.301(a) (Vernon 1996).
43. Id. § 11.301(b).
44. Id. § 19.024(a) (Vernon 1991).
45. Id. § 13.101 (Vernon 1996).
46. Id. § 13.102. A breakaway election was considered in the Waco Independent
School District. However, the district has less than 16,000 students, which means it could
not break into two 8,000-student districts. See Mike Wallace, TEA: Breakaway District Not
an Option, WACO TRIBUNE HERALD, Sept. 12, 1995.
47. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.104(c) (Vernon 1996).
48. Compare id. § 13.0510) (Vernon 1996) (if both district boards disapprove petition
decision cannot be appealed) with id. § 19.022(i) (Vernon 1991) (if either district board
disapproves petition decision can be appealed).
49. Compare id. § 13.051(b)(1)(A) (Vernon 1996) (by majority of registered voters)
with id. § 19.021(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
50. Compare id. § 13.152 (Vernon 1996) (consolidation is initiated by resolution or
petition) with id. § 19.052 (Vernon 1991) (consolidation is initiated by petition).
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the authority that both reviews a petition requesting an election on con-
solidation and orders the election. 51
3. Composition and Elections of Boards of Trustees
Under prior law, boards of trustees had term lengths of two, three,
four, or six years. According to estimates, less than one percent of dis-
tricts had two-year or six-year terms. To provide uniform options state-
wide, Senate Bill 1 standardizes the terms of trustees to three or four
years and requires boards of trustees with two-year or six-year terms to
transition to either a three-year or four-year term system.52 To avoid
gamesmanship, after a board of trustees has made the required change,
the board cannot alter the terms of office.53 In another attempt to en-
courage uniformity among boards of trustees, a district with a board of
trustees of three or five members may by resolution increase and transi-
tion its membership to the more standard seven-member board, instead
of holding an election on the issue as required by prior law. 54
In the old code, certain large districts were required to have nine trust-
ees, with seven elected from single-member districts and the president
and vice-president elected at large.55 That law is continued but not re-
codified; the district "shall continue electing trustees and officers in that
manner until a different method of selection is adopted by resolution of
the board of trustees. ' '5 6 Instead, the code retains a more general law
under which any independent school district may obtain single-member
districts.57 That section is silent on whether a trustee must be elected by a
majority, and a trustee therefore must be elected by plurality under the'
general law in the Election Code.58 If election by majority vote is a
"method of selection," it appears that the large districts could continue to
use a majority vote requirement until they later choose to adopt a plural-
ity vote under the new code.59
Majority vote also was eliminated from the law on electing trustees by
position;60 again, the plurality vote requirement prevails by default.61
Many other items were eliminated from the Education Code because
they either conflicted with or duplicated the Election Code. 62
51. Compare id. § 13.153 (Vernon 1996) with id. § 19.053 (Vernon 1991).
52. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.059 (Vernon 1996); see also id. §§ 23.13-23.16
(Vernon 1987).
53. Id. § 11.059(c) (Vernon 1996).
54. Compare id. § 11.051(c) (Vernon 1996) with id. § 23.021(a) (Vernon 1987).
55. Id. § 23.023 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
56. Id. § 11.062 (Vernon 1996) (emphasis added).
57. Id. § 11.052.
58. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 2.001 (Vernon 1986).
59. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.062 (Vernon 1996).
60. Compare id. § 11.058 with id. § 23.11(h) (Vernon 1987).
61. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 2.001 (Vernon 1986).




A new law was added allowing cumulative voting for the first time in
the history of Texas general law. Some school districts had cumulative
voting systems put in place after litigation and court order; the new law
allows boards of trustees the authority to adopt cumulative voting instead
of going through expensive litigation. The law allows boards of trustees
that elect trustees at large to order elections using cumulative voting. 63
At an election at which more than one trustee position is to be filled, all
voters of the district vote for the positions.64 Each voter may cast a
number of votes, equal to the number of positions to be filled at the elec-
tion, and may cast one or more of the votes for one or more candidates in
any whole-vote combination. 65 The winning candidates are those, in the
number to be elected, with the most votes.66
The effectiveness of the statute, however, is in question. The United
States Department of Justice has questioned why school districts with cu-
mulative voting systems must maintain staggered terms and adopt three
or four year terms of office. Staggered terms and specific terms of office
would put fewer candidates up at a time, which could impact minority
voters' ability to elect candidates of choice under a cumulative voting sys-
tem.67 Boards of trustees should carefully consider such issues and be
aware of the potential for litigation when considering adoption of a cu-
mulative voting scheme.
4. Powers and Duties
Although Senate Bill 1 generally provides more flexibility to school
districts, it also specifies who does what within an independent school
district.68 In doing so, the Legislature tried to allocate power where it
was best suited for educational purposes. A district that wants to try an-
other approach may do so through a local or home-rule charter or a
waiver from the commissioner.
The trustees as a body oversee the management of the district public
schools. 69 In keeping with authority bestowed upon the superintendent
and others, the prior law's "power to manage and govern" is changed to
"power and duty to govern and oversee the management of" the public
schools of the district.70
63. Id. § 11.054(a) (Vernon 1996).
64. Id. § 11.054(b).
65. Id. § 11.054(b), (c).
66. Id. § 11.054(e).
67. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, to the Honorable Antonio 0. Garza, Secretary of State (Aug.
14, 1995) (on file with SMU Law Review).
68. For more on assigned authority, see discussion infra Part III, B; see also TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. subch. A, ch. 44 (Vernon 1996), for provisions governing adoption of a
district budget.
69. Id. § 11.051(a) (Vernon 1996).
70. Compare TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.151(b) (Vernon 1996) with id. § 23.26(b)(Vernon 1987). Prior law also stated that all educational functions not delegated to the
agency shall be performed by "district boards of trustees," while the new law states that all
non-delegated functions are "reserved to and shall be performed by school districts" or
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Besides boards of trustees, at least four other persons and entities have
assigned powers and duties within an independent school district. The
superintendent is the educational leader and chief executive officer of the
district, charged with the day-to-day operations of the school district and
other statutorily assigned duties.71 The principal is the instructional
leader of the school and, among other duties, develops the campus'
budget and assumes responsibility for discipline. 72 The district and cam-
pus committees, which are set up to involve professional staff, parents,
and community members, are given tasks such as assisting superintend-
ents and principals in developing, reviewing, and revising district and
campus improvement plans.73
Despite these impositions on their power, many of which were in prior
law, boards of trustees have more freedom than under prior law. Senate
Bill 1 eliminated many mandates, such as the law that required each dis-
trict to perform a utility billing audit every four years.74 Also gone are
restrictions imposed due to State Board of Education preemption.75
In addition, Senate Bill 1 deleted many authority-granting laws that
said a board "may" do something; either they contained restrictions (a
board may do X as long as it does X in the following way) or they dupli-
cated the board of trustees' broad authority to govern and oversee the
management of the district (a board may do X). However, because some
authorizing laws serve as legal and political refuges for school districts, a
few were kept or added. For example, a provision was added to allow a
board of trustees to adopt rules requiring students to wear uniforms, but
if the board does so it must determine that it would improve learning,
designate funds to provide uniforms to poor students, and exempt or
transfer students whose parents object.76 Another example is the law au-
thorizing districts to allow students who fail state assessments to partici-
pate in graduation ceremonies. 77
Even though it eliminated many authorizing laws, the Legislature
chose to retain a 1993 law that says the board of trustees may contract
open-enrollment charter schools. Id. § 23.25 (Vernon 1987); id. § 11.151(b) (Vernon 1996)
(emphasis added). This allows for flexibility in local charters and in board-delegated
power as well as mirroring authority assigned to other persons and entities within the
school district. See also id. § 11.011.
71. Id. § 11.201 (Vernon 1996); see also id. § 13.351 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
72. Id. § 11.202 (Vernon 1996); see also id. § 13.352 (Vernon 1991). For further discus-
sion of the principal's role in discipline see infra Part VI.
73. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. subch. F, ch. 11 (Vernon 1996), for duties assigned to
the district and campus committees; see also id. §§ 7.056(b)(2), 11.011, 21.352, 21.354,
21.451(b), 37.001(a), 39.094. Given their duties and control, an unanswered question is
whether these committees must comply with the Open Meetings Act. See TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 551.001(3)(H) (Vernon 1994); see also Sierra Club v. Austin Transp. Study
Policy Advisory Comm., 746 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988), appealed after remand,
843 S.W.2d 683, (Tex. App.-Austin 1992 reh'g overruled, error denied).
74. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 23.34 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (as added by Acts 1993, 73d
Leg., ch. 660, § 18).
75. See supra note 20.
76. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.162 (Vernon 1996).
77. Id. § 28.025(b).
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with a public or private entity for the provision of educational services.78
During the legislative session, the Texas Attorney General issued an
opinion that dampened enthusiasm for using the section in privatization
efforts.79 The opinion states that the section does not relieve school dis-
tricts that enter such contracts from complying with statutory mandates
applicable to school districts.80 Many mandates in the code expressly ap-
ply to school districts and to students enrolled in a school district. Even if
the district contracts for their education, those students would still be stu-
dents of the district, and thus districts must ensure compliance with man-
dates such as class-size limits, minimum number of days of instruction,
the "no-pass no-play" suspension from extracurricular activities, and an-
nual state examinations. On the other hand, some laws such as the right
to a duty-free lunch do not apply to as many educators after Senate Bill
1.81 In the new law, a "classroom teacher" is an educator who is directly
employed by a school district. 82 If the entity contracts with the educator,
and the board of trustees contracts with the entity, the educator is not
employed by the district, is not a "classroom teacher," and is not subject
to those requirements. On the whole, however, many mandates still ap-
ply to contract entities, unless the contract is for alternative education
placement. 83
D. LOCAL-CHARTERS
The contracted services provision may be of limited use in achieving
flexibility in educational arrangements. Many mandates apply, while pro-
tections, such as eligibility for state retirement benefits and limitations on
liability, do not apply. To allow districts, educators, and parents the flexi-
bility to create educational systems that work best for children, Senate
Bill 1 set up a system of charters. 84 If a district or school has a charter,
protections such as retirement and limitations on liability apply, but many
mandates do not.8 5
In a way, the state school laws can be divided into "essentials" (e.g.,
school finance and the accountability system) and "best practices" (e.g.,
class size and staff development). Some laws are essential and must apply
to all public schools, because the Texas Constitution requires them or
simply because they are integral to the public education system. How-
ever, some laws, while splendid ideas, do not suit every student or situa-
78. Id. § 23.34 (Vernon Supp. 1995) (as added by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 347, § 402).
79. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-335 (1995).
80. Id. at 220.
81. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.405 (Vernon 1996). Because they have no similar
requirement of district employment, librarians would still be entitled to duty-free lunch.
82. Id. § 5.001(2).
83. See id. § 37.008(c) (off-campus alternative education programs are not subject to
requirements in Title 2 of Education Code other than limitations on liability, reporting
requirements, or requirements imposed by the discipline or accountability chapters).
84. Id. § 12.002. Lt. Gov. Bob Bullock actively promoted charter schools, and his staff
presented the concept to the Select Committee.
85. Id. §§ 12.012-12.013, 12.055-12.057, 12.103-12.105.
[Vol. 49
EDUCATION
tion. The latter laws set up the Legislature's ideal of an educational
system, but the charter law in effect allows local entities to opt out and
use their own ideas.
The idea behind charters is to allow more freedom to those who want
it. Senate Bill 1 creates three types of charters, each with its own thresh-
old for freedom from state mandates.86 A home-rule school district char-
ter is adopted by a majority of the district's voters.87 A campus or
campus program charter may be granted by the board of trustees of a
district if a majority of parents and teachers sign a petition requesting the
charter.88 At an open-enrollment charter, which is granted by the State
Board of Education, students attend and teachers work at the school by
choice. 89 A charter allows innovation and experimentation. At the same
time, each charter type is focused on student performance because each
must comply with the state's accountability system to retain its charter
status.
1. Home-Rule School District Charter
A primary reason for a home-rule school district charter is to allow
local citizens to release a district from state mandates and design a system
tailored to local needs. Instead of special interest groups negotiating
compromises at the state level regarding, for example, who should have
the authority to hire, fire, and promote employees, those issues can be
decided locally, much as they are in home-rule municipalities. Politically,
home-rule school districts change state-level debate. In the future, it
should be more difficult to impose a state mandate-especially an un-
funded mandate-on a home-rule school district than to impose a man-
date on school districts generally, as is the case with home-rule and
general-law municipalities.
A home-rule charter, adopted by a district's voters,90 lets the district
comply with a reduced set of Education Code mandates while retaining
all the powers of school districts. The home-rule school district is subject
to federal laws, state laws (other than the Education Code), and the fol-
lowing Education Code provisions: criminal offenses; limitations on liabil-
ity; data reporting requirements necessary to monitor compliance with
the home-rule law; educator certification; educator rights regarding join-
ing groups and salary deductions for dues; criminal history records; stu-
dent admissions, attendance, or inter-district or inter-county transfers;
elementary class-size limits for any low-performing campus; high school
graduation requirements; federal and state laws and court orders related
to bilingual or special education programs; pre-kindergarten programs;
textbooks; health and safety provisions, including school bus safety; the
86. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.002 (Vernon 1996).
87. Id. § 12.021(a).
88. Id. § 12.052.
89. Id. § 12.101.
90. Id. § 12.021(a).
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"no-pass no-play" suspension from extracurricular activities; the state
school finance system; the state accountability system; and school district
bonds, tax rates, and purchasing requirements.91
Significant mandates that do not apply to home-rule districts include
teacher contracts, minimum salary schedule, appraisals, staff develop-
ment, elementary class-size limits (except for low-performing campuses),
compensatory education programs, expulsion, and alternative education
programs.
The less the state law mandates, the more the district can innovate;
because of this broader autonomy, the home-rule charter law also en-
hances citizen input and emphasizes consensus. A home-rule charter is
initiated either by a petition signed by at least five percent of the district's
registered voters or by a two-thirds vote of the board of trustees. 92 At
that point the board appoints a fifteen-member charter commission.93 A
majority of the members must be parents of district students, and at least
twenty-five percent of the members must be classroom teachers elected
by their peers.94 The commission has one year to complete a charter pro-
posal.95 The proposed charter is sent to the commissioner for legal re-
view and to the Texas Secretary of State, who almost certainly will direct
the board of trustees to send the charter to the United States Department
of Justice ("DOJ") for preclearance review under the Voting Rights
Act.96 The board of trustees sets the election. For the home-rule charter
to take effect, a majority of voters must approve it and at least twenty-
five percent of the district's registered voters must vote in the election in
which the charter adoption issue is on the ballot.97 Most likely this will
require coordination with a presidential or gubernatorial general election.
A charter amendment is initiated by action of the home-rule governing
body or by petition signed by five percent of the voters.98 No charter
commission is needed before an election may be called, and the election
turnout requirement is twenty percent.99 An election on rescission of a
home-rule charter must be ordered if two-thirds of the governing body
vote or if five percent of the voters sign a petition to do so, and the turn-
out requirement is twenty-five percent. 100 Thus, the requirements for
getting in and out of a charter are the same.
91. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.012-12.013 (Vernon 1996). For a more comprehen-
sive analysis of applicable laws, see The Office of the Governor, "The Home-Rule School
District Education Code," Sept. 1995 (on file with the author).
92. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.014.
93. Id. § 12.015(a).
94. Id. § 12.015(b).
95. Id. § 12.015(c).
96. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.017 (Vernon 1996). The Secretary of State's office
has indicated that it will recommend any charter be sent to the U.S. Department of Justice.
97. Id. §§ 12.021-12.022.
98. Id. § 12.020.
99. Id. § 12.022(b).
100. Id. § 12.030.
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The home-rule charter must describe, among other matters, the dis-
trict's educational programs, any basis for the charter's probation or revo-
cation, and the budget and audit processes. 10 1 The charter also must
describe the governing structure of the district and campuses.10 2 Because
the DOJ will review the charter under the Voting Rights Act, the charter
commission probably should keep the same elected board of trustees
structure in place if it wants to avoid a drawn-out preclearance. Also, in
light of questions asked by the DOJ in the preclearance of Senate Bill 1,
school districts would be well advised to provide copies of the home-rule
charter in Spanish.10 3
In cases of annexation involving different statuses (one district has a
home-rule school district charter and the other does not), the status of the
receiving district is the status for both districts following annexation. In
cases of consolidation, the ballot language must specify whether the pro-
posed consolidated district would be governed as a district with a home-
rule charter or as a district that does not have a home-rule charter. 1°4
School districts should include any change in the method of election in
the notice of any election to consolidate or annex one or more home-rule
districts. That is, if one district has at-large positions and the other has
cumulative voting or single-member districts, the election notice should
explain what voting system would exist upon consolidation or annexation.
The DOJ seemed concerned that such notice is not provided directly on
the ballot.'0 5
The charter may be placed on probation or revoked if the SBOE deter-
mines, after a public hearing, that the district committed a material viola-
tion of the charter, failed to satisfy generally accepted accounting
standards, or failed to comply with the home-rule subchapter or other
applicable laws. If a district has been rated academically unacceptable
for two years under the state accountability system, the commissioner
may request the State Board of Education to revoke the district's home-
rule charter. 10 6 If a home-rule charter is revoked or rescinded the district
operates under the general laws that apply to all school districts. 1.07
2. Campus or Campus Program Charter
A second form of charter gives autonomy to a school district campus or
a program at a campus. The board of trustees may grant a campus or
campus program charter to parents and teachers upon receiving a peti-
tion signed by the parents of a majority of the students at that campus
and a majority of the classroom teachers at that campus.'08 The board
101. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.016 (Vernon 1996).
102. Id. § 12.016(4).
103. See Patrick, supra note 67.
104. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. at § 12.029(b) (Vernon 1996).
105. See Patrick, supra note 67.
106. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.131(a)(10) (Vernon 1996).
107. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.027(a) (Vernon 1996).
108. Id. § 12.052.
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may not "arbitrarily deny" a charter. 10 9 A charter is in the form of a
contract between the board president and chief operating officer of the
campus or program. 110 The charter is contingent upon satisfactory stu-
dent performance in the state accountability system."' A board of trust-
ees may place on probation or revoke a charter if it determines, after a
hearing, that the campus or program materially violated the charter,
failed to satisfy accounting standards, or failed to comply with applicable
laws and rules. These are limited reasons; a board of trustees might care-
fully consider beforehand what constitutes a material violation of the
charter. For example, the charter could require a minimum attendance
level so that the program or campus does not become too costly for the
district.
If the charter is granted, the campus or program can be exempt from
rules and policies of the board of trustees and only has to comply with
Education Code provisions relating to criminal offenses; data reporting
requirements necessary to monitor compliance with the charter law; crim-
inal history records; high school graduation requirements; special educa-
tion and bilingual education; prekindergarten programs; the "no-pass no-
play" suspension from extracurricular activities; health and safety provi-
sions; and the state accountability system.1 2 Unlike entities that contract
for educational services, campus or campus programs are considered gov-
ernmental bodies, and retirement benefits and limitations on liability
apply.113
A potential drawback of this form of charter is that a minority of par-
ents and teachers who oppose the petition may want state law protections
to apply, but they have no choice, because students and teachers can be
assigned to the school. For this reason, boards of trustees may want to
include in the charter either an opt-out or an opt-in clause for parents and
teachers. Another drawback is the potential for squelching a charter for
a small, one-classroom program that is intensely supported by the parents
and teachers who would be involved but does not get signatures from a
majority of parents and teachers at "that school campus" who are suspi-
cious or indifferent. Interestingly, revision of a program charter only re-
quires a petition signed by a majority of the parents and classroom
teachers "in the program." 114 Perhaps future revision of this law could
allow one-hundred percent of the parents and teachers expected to be
involved in the program to petition for program charters, with stipula-
tions that other students could not be assigned to the program without
their parents' consent and other teachers could not be transferred to the
109. Id. § 12.052(c). Most likely denial will require the board of trustees to make a
finding listing its reasons.
110. Id. § 12.059.
111. Id. § 12.058(2).
112. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.055 (Vernon 1996).
113. Id. § 12.055.
114. Id. § 12.061.
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program over their objection.115
3. Open-Enrollment Charter School
Many laws exist because educators, employees, or students want pro-
tection in a public school system that is effectively a monopoly. When a
campus or board of trustees does not respond to the desires of parents or
teachers, their only options may be turning to the Legislature or dropping
out of the public schools. Thus the code contains laws giving teachers
minimum salaries and duty-free lunch and giving elementary students
class-size limits.116 Because students and teachers are assigned to a
school and cannot go elsewhere for public education or, arguably, em-
ployment, these protections provide a balance against what is effectively a
monopoly.
If schools were available to provide an alternative, and the choice to
attend that school was optional, many state law protections would not be
needed in the schools. If a school wants to stay in business, by keeping
students and good teachers, it will behave accordingly. In exchange for
minimal mandates, these schools would be subject to market accountabil-
ity. In addition, the schools would be subject to the state accountability
system to ensure that the students are not educationally shortchanged
and to provide information to parents on the quality of education pro-
vided by that school. 117
Senate Bill 1 sets up open-enrollment charter schools to provide par-
ents this option." 8 The SBOE is authorized to grant no more than
twenty charters for an open-enrollment charter school and may only
grant such a charter to institutions of higher education, governmental en-
tities, or non-profit corporations. A school may be operated in a school
district facility with the agreement of the board of trustees, but an educa-
tor employed by a school district cannot be transferred to the charter
school over the educator's objection.119
The open-enrollment charter school is subject to the same laws as the
campus or program charter. 120 Likewise, its governing body is subject to
laws on open meetings and open records, retirement benefits, and limita-
tions on liability. 121 Funding is derived from state and local funding that
115. See, e.g., id. § 12.101(d) (example of the non-coercion of educators).
116. See, e.g., id. ch. 26 (parental rights). Senate Bill 1 added chapter 26 because many
parents feel helpless in the present system.
117. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 12.102(3) & 12.111(3)-(4) (Vernon 1996) (charter sets
level of student performance on state assessment instruments). This flexibility allows
open-enrollment charter schools to target special populations.
118. In fact, the law encourages and requires opportunities for parent input. See id.
§ 12.110(c) & 12.116(b).
119. Id. § 12.101.
120. Id. § 12.104.
121. TEX. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 12.105 (Vernon 1996); see also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 821.001(7) (Vernon Supp. 1996) (retirement system definition of "employer" now in-
cludes "agencies in the state responsible for public education").
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would have been spent on the student in the student's resident district. 122
The school may not charge tuition and must provide transportation 123 to
the same extent a school district is required by law to provide it.1 2 4 A
charter must describe the geographical area served by the program and
may draw from all or part of one or more districts.125 A charter must
prohibit discrimination in the school's admission policy based on sex, na-
tional origin, ethnicity, religion, disability, academic or athletic ability, or
resident district, but a charter may allow exclusion of students with docu-
mented histories of criminal or discipline problems. 126
The SBOE sets up criteria for selecting a program and may approve or
deny an application based on criteria it adopts.' 27 The SBOE may mod-
ify, place on probation, revoke, or deny renewal of the charter if it deter-
mines that the person operating the school materially violated the
charter, failed to satisfy accounting standards, or failed to comply with
applicable laws. 128 The SBOE must also designate an organization to
evaluate student performance, student discipline, and parental and stu-
dent satisfaction with the schools.129 This again emphasizes the theme of
open-enrollment charter schools: parental and student satisfaction.
Senate Bill 1 also continues a prior law authorizing the State Board of
Education to create and appoint boards of trustees for special-purpose
school districts, 130 which are similar to open-enrollment charter schools.
These niche districts include military reservation school districts131 and
districts for the education of students in special situations whose educa-
tional needs are not adequately met by regular school districts. 132
III. TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES
A. CERTIFICATION AND PERMITS
1. State Board for Educator Certification
Senate Bill 1 creates the State Board for Educator Certification to rec-
ognize educators as professionals and to let the profession, though a ma-
jority-educator state licensing board, largely regulate itself.133 The board,
which the governor appoints, has the authority to specify classes of edu-
cator certificates; specify the qualifications for each certificate and the
period for which it is valid; provide for disciplinary proceedings, including
122. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.106-12.107 (Vernon 1996). District debt service
is excluded from the amount that follows the student.
123. Id. § 12.108.
124. Id. § 12.109.
125. Id. § 12.111(13).
126. Id. § 12.111(6).
127. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.110(a) (Vernon 1996).
128. Id. § 12.115.
129. Id. § 12.118.
130. Id. § 11.351; id. § 11.28 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
131. Id. § 11.355 (Vernon 1996).
132. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.351(a) (Vernon 1996).
133. Id. § 21.031.
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the suspension or revocation of certificates- provide for the adoption,
amendment, and enforcement of an educator's code of ethics; and pro-
vide for continuing education, a new requirement that is consistent with
other professions' regulations. 34 The State Board of Education has veto
authority over State Board for Educator Certification rules and may re-
ject a proposed rule upon a two-thirds vote. If the SBOE fails to act on a
proposed rule within ninety days, the rule is approved. 135
2. School District Teaching Permits
Senate Bill 1 also allows school districts to issue a teaching permit and
employ a person who holds a baccalaureate degree or will teach career
and technology education. 136 The district must send the commissioner a
statement outlining the person's qualifications and the subject or class the
person will teach.137 Pending the commissioner's action, the person may
teach the subject or class;138 if the commissioner fails to act within thirty
days the district may issue the person a school district teaching permit for
that subject or class.139 If within 30 days the commissioner informs the
district that the person is not qualified to teach, that person may not
teach.140 Teaching permits are not transferrable across districts and may
be revoked for cause. 14' A district is effectively limited in the number of
permits it can grant because it must employ enough teachers certified by
the SBEC to maintain an average ratio of not less than one certified
teacher for each twenty students in average daily attendance.' 42
3. Educators
An educator is a person who is required to hold a "certificate" issued
under Subchapter B, Chapter 21, which is the subchapter that contains
both SBEC certificates and school district teaching permits.143 Clearly,
the "certificate" at issue is the kind issued by the SBEC; the provision
that requires a person to hold a certificate differentiates between certifi-
cates and permits.144 Laws that refer to "educators" therefore refer only
to persons issued certificates by the SBEC. This includes "classroom
teachers," who are required to be "educators."'' 45 Thus, districts are not
required to give permitees the same kind of Education Code benefits that
134. Id. § 21.041.
135. Id. § 21.042. This arrangement is akin to the SBOE's relationship to the Univer-
sity Interscholastic League, whose rules must be consistent with SBOE Rules. Id
§ 33.083(a).
136. Id. § 21.055(b).
137. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.055(c) (Vernon 1996).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 21.055(d).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 21.055(e).
142. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.111 (Vernon 1996).
143. Id. § 5.001(5).
144. Id. § 21.003(a).
145. Id. § 5.001(2).
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certified educators receive. 146
B. CONTRACTS-AUTHORITY AND ENTITLEMENT
1. Authority
As in prior law, the code continues to specify who does what in hiring,
firing, assigning, and promoting. In hiring, the superintendent has sole
authority to make recommendations to the board of trustees regarding
the selection of all personnel other than the superintendent.1 47 The
board may delegate final selection authority to the superintendent or may
accept or reject the superintendent's recommendation.148 If the board
rejects the recommendation, the superintendent makes alternative rec-
ommendations until the board accepts a recommendation.' 49 A campus
principal, based on criteria the principal develops after informal consulta-
tion with the faculty, approves teacher and staff appointments for that
campus from a pool of applicants selected by the district or from appli-
cants who meet district-established hiring requirements.150 However, the
superintendent or superintendent's designee has final placement author-
ity for a teacher transferred because of enrollment shifts or program
changes in a district.' 5 '
The board may set terms of employment with the district or may dele-
gate that authority to the superintendent. 52 The principal must assign,
evaluate, and promote personnel assigned to the campus.' 53 The princi-
pal also must recommend to the superintendent action on the termina-
tion, suspension, or term contract nonrenewal of an employee assigned to
the campus,154 and the superintendent initiates the action.155
2. Entitlement to Contracts
Senate Bill 1 clearly spells out who is entitled to the statutory scheme
of contracts: "each classroom teacher, principal, librarian, nurse, or coun-
selor.' 56 A district may, but is not required to, hire anyone else under a
statutory contract.' 57 A district may have a policy that specifies other
employees who are entitled to contracts. Likewise, a district may have
146. See, e.g., id. §§ 21.002 (contract requirement for classroom teachers); 21.401 (10
month contracts and minimum days of service requirement for educators); 21.4011, 21.402(minimum salary schedule); 21.404 (planning and preparation time); 21.405 (duty-free
lunch for classroom teachers and librarians). "Educator" does not include a nurse, for
example, because the statute does not require a nurse to hold an SBEC-issued certificate.
Id. § 21.003; see Dodd v. Meno, 870 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Tex. 1994).
147. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.163(a)(1) (Vernon 1996).
148. Id. § 11.163(b), (c).
149. Id. § 11.163(b).
150. Id. § 11.202(b)(1).
151. Id. § 11.202(d).
152. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.163(c) (Vernon 1996).
153. Id. § 11.202(b)(5).
154. Id. § 11.202(b)(6).
155. Id. § 11.201(d)(4).
156. Id. § 21.002(a).
157. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.002(b) (Vernon 1996).
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existing, pre-Senate Bill 1 contracts that obligate it to hire certain district
employees under the statutory contracts. If either policy or contracts re-
quire the district to hire an employee under statutory contracts beyond
the Section 21.002 minimum, the employee is a "teacher" for purposes of
Section 21.101 and can get a probationary, term, or continuing con-
tract.158 A superintendent, however, is not eligible as a "teacher" in the
probationary and continuing contracts subchapters and can only get a
term contract.1 59
By policy, a school board spells out specific positions or categories of
positions to which continuing or term contracts apply.1 60 The categories
of positions may be based on considerations such as length of service.' 61
For example, a school board could create a tenure system in which teach-
ers earn their way from term contracts to continuing contracts if they
meet certain criteria, which could include degrees earned or student
performance.
Before discussing the substance of the new contract law, it should be
noted that many of the teacher benefits such as contract law are now
limited to full-time certified teachers. The definition of "classroom
teacher" is limited to "an educator who is employed by a school district
and who, not less than an average of four hours each day, teaches in an
academic instructional setting or a career and technology instructional
setting."' 62 The term does not include a teacher's aide or a full-time ad-
ministrator. 63 Generally, the narrow "classroom teacher" definition is
used where mandates are imposed on districts-e.g., minimum salaries
and contracts-and a more broad term such as "employee" or "educator"
is used where legal blessings are bestowed-e.g., statutory immunity from
liability. 164
The "classroom teacher" definition provides flexibility. First, as dis-
cussed previously, an "educator" is not a person teaching under a school
district teaching permit.165 Second, "[e]mployed by a school district"
means that the definition does not reach an open-enrollment charter
school. Third, the four hour per day average for teaching 166 means the
definition does not include most part-time teachers. For example, a rural
school with too few students to warrant a full-time teacher in a subject
could hire a part-time teacher, providing students with a class and provid-
ing a teacher with a job. Or a teacher could contract her services to sev-
158. See id. § 21.101 ("teacher" to whom contract laws apply does not include a person
who is not entitled to a contract under Section 21.002, an existing contract, or district
policy).
159. See id. §§ 21.101, 21.151, 21.201.
160. Id. § 21.002(c).
161. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.002(c) (Vernon 1996).
162. Id. § 5.001(2).
163. Id.
164. Compare id. §§ 21.002, 21.402, 21.404 and 21.405 with id. § 22.051.
165. See text accompanying note 143 supra.
166. The four hour requirement derives from prior law that required teachers to teach
four hours per day. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.907 (Vernon 1991).
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eral districts with a contract of her own design, allowing one person,
rather than a busload of students, to travel between campuses. It also
allows flexibility for a school district considering hiring a teacher who had
taught in the public schools for the previous five of eight years. 167 If the
district had reservations because the teacher had been fired from her last
job, the district could hire her to teach an average of three hours each day
and keep her on a probationary contract. Last, "academic instructional
setting or a career and technology instructional setting" means the defini-
tion does not reach persons who teach or work in a different setting.
Thus, a coach who teaches math for two hours and coaches for two hours
in a non-academic setting is not a "classroom teacher." This reaffirms
Justice Gonzalez's observation that a coach with a losing football record
does not have a protected property interest in continued employment as a
coach. 168
C. CONTRACTS, HEARINGS, AND APPEALS
Texas school districts employ a quarter million teachers under a statu-
tory scheme of probationary, term, and continuing contracts. 169 Proba-
tionary contracts for beginning teachers have little due process at the end
of the probationary term, and a teacher can be terminated if, in the board
of trustees' judgment, the district's best interests are served. 170 Term con-
tracts provide procedures for renewal or nonrenewal at the end of the
contract term, and boards of trustees adopt reasons for nonrenewal. 171
Continuing contracts are basically tenure. For these three types of con-
tracts, prior law had inconsistencies in the application of contracts, rea-
sons for termination, and processes for termination. Terminating an
ineffective teacher was difficult. The substantive statutory reasons for an
action were too inflexible, and the process was lengthy and cumbersome.
Senate Bill 1 drastically transformed the law on contract requirements
and on teacher discharges and suspensions. While districts were given
greater latitude in the substantive reasons for firing a teacher-to let a
district free itself of bad or ineffective teachers-the procedural safe-
guards for mid-contract actions became a more formal administrative
process that uses independent fact finders who are certified hearing
examiners.
1. Probationary Contract
Prior law had separate laws for probationary contracts under term con-
tracts and continuing contracts; 172 Senate Bill 1 streamlines them into one
167. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.102(b) (Vernon 1996).
168. Grounds v. Tolar, 856 S.W.2d 417, 420, 424 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J., concurring)
(teacher has property interest in job, but coach does not).
169. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. subch. C-E, ch. 21 (Vernon 1996).
170. Id. § 21.103(a).
171. Id. § 21.203(b).
172. Id. §§ 13.101-13.105, 13.109-13.116, 21.209 (Vernon 1987 & 1991 & Supp. 1995).
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cohesive law. 173 Initially, a district hires a person under a probationary
contract of not more than one year, renewable for two additional one-
year periods. 174 A fourth probationary year is allowed if a board of trust-
ees doubts the person should be given a term or continuing contract. 175
The board may terminate employment at the end of a probationary con-
tract if, in its judgment, the district's best interests are served. 176 The
board's decision to terminate a person employed under a probationary
contract is final and cannot be appealed.177 A district that does not ter-
minate employment under a probationary contract must grant the teacher
either a term or continuing contract. 178 A person on a term or continuing
contract may agree to return to probation instead of being nonrenewed
or discharged. 179
2. Term Contract
Term contract law is similar to prior law. A district still must list rea-
sons for nonrenewal of a term contract, although the teacher "does not
have a property interest in a contract beyond its term.' u 0 This attempts
to render moot a Texas Supreme Court decision that held that the Term
Contract Nonrenewal Act gives teachers a constitutionally protected
property interest in continued employment.' 8 ' A teacher still may re-
quest a hearing on a nonrenewal, and the board of trustees must conduct
the hearing in accordance with its rules, which may use the new hearing
examiner process.' 8 2 An aggrieved teacher may appeal to the commis-
sioner for a review of the decision.'8 3 As in prior law, the commissioner
may not substitute his judgment for that of the board of trustees unless
the board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 184
Superintendents are limited to term contracts of no more than five
years;185 however, given the financial disincentive in making a severance
payment, boards of trustees might be well advised to limit superintendent
contracts to no more than one or two years. Senate Bill 1 attempts to
dissuade a school board from making costly severance payments when
terminating a superintendent's contract by requiring the commissioner to
reduce the amount of state funds the district receives in an amount equal
to the superintendent's severance payment.186
173. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.101-21.106 (Vernon 1996).
174. Id. § 21.102(b).
175. Id. § 21.102(c).
176. Id. § 21.103(a).
177. Id.
178. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.103(b) (Vernon 1996).
179. Id. § 21.106.
180. Id. § 21.204.
181. Grounds, 856 S.W.2d at 420.
182. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.207 (Vernon 1996).
183. Id. § 21.209.
184. Id.
185. Id § 11.201(b).
186. Id. § 11.201(c).
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3. Continuing Contract and Mid-Contract Actions
Senate Bill 1 profoundly changed the substance and procedure of con-
tinuing contract law. Prior law differentiated between mid-year and end-
of-year actions and provided rather limited, rigid lists of reasons for
each. 187 The new law collapses all prior lists of reasons for discharge and
suspension without pay into the more flexible "good cause."'1 88 The law
eliminates the mid-year and end-of-year distinctions because both occur
during a contract and should be treated the same in substance and proce-
dure. The same reasoning applies to mid-contract actions for probation-
ary and term contracts. Thus, a person proposed to be discharged at any
time during a continuing contract, or who may be discharged mid-con-
tract under any type of contract, or who may be suspended without pay
can request a hearing before a certified hearing examiner. 189
4. Hearings and Appeals
The hearings law for continuing contract and mid-contract actions
changed dramatically from prior law, which provided full-blown hearings
before the board of trustees, the commissioner, and a Travis County dis-
trict court. 190 The new law streamlines cases by having one hearing at the
local level, using either a certified commissioner-appointed hearing exam-
iner or an agreed hearing examiner, and setting concrete deadlines which
are designed to resolve the case by the next school year.191 The board of
trustees may reject or change a finding of fact if it is not supported by
substantial evidence. 192 The teacher may appeal to the commissioner,
who reviews the record and may not substitute his judgment for the
board's unless the decision was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or the
hearing examiner's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 193
On appeal, a local or Travis County district court may review the local
record (and any commissioner record on procedural defects) under the
substantial evidence rule. 194
D. APPRAISALS
A school district must appraise each teacher and administrator at least
annually. 95 The district may adopt either the appraisal instrument rec-
ommended by the commissioner or its own instrument. 96 In teacher ap-
187. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 13.109, 13.110 (Vernon 1991).,
188. Id. § 21.156 (Vernon 1996) (good cause is "failure to meet the accepted standards
of conduct for the profession as generally recognized and applied in similarly situated
school districts in this state.").
189. Id. § 21.251.
190. Id. §§ 11.13, 13.112-13.115, 21.210 (Vernon 1987 & 1991 & Supp 1995).
191. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.251-.260 (Vernon 1996).
192. Id. § 21.259(c).
193. Id. § 21.303(b).
194. Id. § 21.307.
195. Id. §§ 21.352(c), 21.354(c).
196. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.352(a), 21.354(c) (Vernon 1996).
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praisals, the local instrument must be developed by campus and district
committees and approved by the board of trustees;197 in administrator
appraisals the local instrument must be developed in consultation with
the district and campus committees. 198 Just as the law has required the
use of student performance information in evaluating superintendents
and principals, Senate Bill 1 requires teacher appraisals to include consid-
eration of the performance of the teachers' students. 199 Principal ap-
praisals also must include student performance. For those campuses
showing the most improvement in student performance, the commis-
sioner may award incentive payments to principals.200
The appraisal subchapter also makes confidential "a document evaluat-
ing the performance of a teacher or administrator."'201 The interpretation
of this ambiguity should be guided by common sense; evaluation of stu-
dents' performance in a particular teacher's classroom is not intended to
be protected from the open records law.
E. MINIMUM SALARIES
At the urging of Rep. Paul Sadler, Chairman of the House Public Edu-
cation Committee and co-author of Senate Bill 1, many teachers received
or will receive a pay raise. Senate Bill 1 substantially changed the salary
law by expanding the schedule from 11 to 21 steps and phasing out the
career ladder stipend.202 After being placed on the new salary schedule,
all teachers must receive the greater of their current salary or the mini-
mum salary identified on the schedule.
After the 1995-1996 school year, the salary at each step of the schedule
is not defined in dollars but is instead a function of the amount of money
the state appropriates per student.203 Tying the pay scale to appropria-
tions means that as the state spends more per student, the salary schedule
automatically adjusts and increases the minimum salary required at each
step. If state spending per student decreases, however, the minimum
schedule would remain at the higher amount.20 4 The minimum required
length of teacher contracts is tied to increases in the minimum schedule:
for every three days' worth of pay added to the minimum schedule, teach-
ers will be required to work one additional day.20 5
197. Id. § 21.352(a)(2).
198. Id. § 21.354(c)(2).
199. Id. §§ 21.351(a)(2), 21.352(a)(2)(B).
200. Id. § 21.357.
201. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.355 (Vernon 1996); see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 552.101 (Vernon 1994).
202. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.4011, 21.402-21.403 (Vernon 1996). The minimum
salary schedule is now limited to classroom teachers and full-time librarians.
203. Id. § 21.402(a).
204. Id. § 21.402(d).




The prior law on immunity from liability for professional employees is
reshuffled but essentially the same. School districts still must adopt poli-
cies specifying the duties of each of its professional positions of employ-
ment.206 The wording of the grant of immunity has changed slightly, but
does not appear to have been changed in substance.20 7 The definition of
"professional employee" has been expanded to clarify in statute who
qualifies for immunity.208
Additionally, Senate Bill 1 added a limitation on liability for private or
independent institutions of higher education that provide volunteer serv-
ices to primary or secondary schools.20 9 The bill also retains but divides
into two sections the law on frivolous lawsuits against district employees
and boards of trustees.210
IV. STUDENTS
A. ADMISSION AND ENROLLMENT
A number of measures were meant to combat gangs in schools. The
first relates to a student who is living apart from his parents and who
wants to attend school in the district where the student but not the par-
ents resides. The new code says that a board of trustees does not have to
admit the student if the student has been expelled, sent to an alternative
education program, or is on probation.211 Second, the district may re-
quire evidence of a person's eligibility to attend district schools.212 The
district must establish minimum proof of residency acceptable to the dis-
trict and may make reasonable inquiries to verify eligibility.2 13 Third, if a
person with legal authority to enroll a child in school cannot be located,
the district must notify the Department of Protective and Regulatory
Services, admit the child, and direct any communication required with the
parent to the department.2 14
The bill also allows local control over admissions decisions. A school
district can decide for itself who qualifies as legally responsible for the
child.2 15 In instances in which parents abandon a child, and grandparents
206. Id. § 11.163(a).
207. Compare TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.051 (Vernon 1996) with id. § 21.912(b)
(Vernon 1987).
208. Id. § 22.051(c) (Vernon 1996); see LeLeaux v. Hanshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist.,
835 S.W.2d 49, 53 (Tex. 1992) (bus driver is "professional employee"). "Certification" in
§ 22.051(c)(4) should be read broadly, as (c) refers to several classes of employees who,
like bus drivers, will not be certified by the State Board for Educator Certification.
209. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.054 (Vernon 1996).
210. Id. §§ 11.161, 22.055.
211. Id. § 25.001(d). This does not let a district exclude a student in a residential place-
ment because typically the student is under a court order and thus resides with a "person
having lawful control ... under a court order." Id. § 25.001(b)(2).
212. Id. § 25.001(c).
213. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.001(c) (Vernon 1996).
214. Id. § 25.002(f).
215. Id. § 25.0010).
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are left in charge of the child, the grandparents might not be acting under
the authority of a court order. The code lets a school board create a
policy specifying, for example, that a grandparent of a child is recognized
as legally responsible for the child in his or her care until a parent can be
located. A district could, if it wished, create a policy specifying proof of
legal responsibility, such as a particular degree of consanguinity and tan-
gible evidence (e.g., the child's food and clothing bills).
B. RIGHTS OF PARENTS AND STUDENTS
Although a major purpose of Senate Bill 1 was local control, it also
created a plethora of new rights for parents and students. Perhaps if
home-rule school districts and charter schools had existed previously,
parents could have addressed many of these rights in a charter on the
local level rather than through state law. Instead, the Legislature allo-
cated power where it was best suited for educational purposes. Placing
rights such as choice of school with the parent puts the person closest to
the student in charge of the student's educational needs. It also affords a
more quick, direct approach to meeting a student's needs than waging a
lengthy political battle to create or change a charter or elect a new school
board. Thus, the burden is shifted: If a community or school district does
not want these rights, or wants to address them in a different way than
that prescribed by the Legislature, it can opt for a charter, under which
many of these laws do not apply.216
1. Parental Rights
Senate Bill 1 added many new entitlements for parents and students.
A new chapter, "Parental Rights and Responsibilities," grants rights con-
cerning academic programs; 217 access to student records, 218 state assess-
ments,219 teaching materials,220 and board meetings;221 right to full
information regarding school activities of a child;222 consent for psycho-
logical examinations and for certain videotaping or tape recording; 223 and
grievance procedures. 224 In addition, parents have the right to temporar-
ily remove their child from a class or activity that conflicts with their reli-
gious or moral beliefs; however, the parent must notify the teacher in
writing before removing the child.2 25 Removal under this provision can-
not be used to avoid a test and does not exempt a child from satisfying
grade level or graduation requirements. 226
216. See id. §§ 12.012-12.013 (listing the laws applicable to home-rule school districts).
217. Id. § 26.003.
218. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 26.004 (Vernon 1996).
219. Id. § 26.005. For more on access to state examinations, see infra part VII.
220. Id. § 26.006.
221. Id. § 26.007.
222. Id. § 26.008.
223. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 26.009 (Vernon 1996).
224. Id. § 26.011.




2. Public Education Grant Program
If a school is clearly failing to educate students, Senate Bill 1 provides
an escape hatch for parents to transfer their children to another school in
the district or transfer them (and state and local funds) to another dis-
trict.2 27 To be eligible, the student must be assigned to a public school
campus at which 50 or more of students did not pass a state assessment
instrument in the preceding three years or that at any time in the preced-
ing three years was identified as low-performing.22 8
In the case of transfer to another district, the chosen district may accept
or reject the student's application but may not use criteria that discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, ethnicity, academic achievement, athletic abili-
ties, language proficiency, sex, or socioeconomic status.2 29 When
transferring, the student is entitled to receive a public education grant
reflecting most of the total state and local funds per student for the home
school district.2 30
3. Educational Program Access
Another provision requires a school district to offer a particular pro-
gram at a school if the year before parents or guardians of at least 22
students at a school request a transfer to another school in the district to
enroll in an educational program offered at that school.2 31 The law has
great merit in attempting to address educational needs at a school. Some
drawbacks, however, may emerge: the district must offer the program the
next year even if no one is interested anymore; it does not address the
immediate educational needs of the students requesting transfers; the stu-
dents requesting the program may not be qualified for the program; and,
especially in the case of an expensive magnet program, it might be more
efficient to bring the students to the program rather than the program to
the students.
4. Campus Assignment and Transfers
Parents' rights to request or object to campus assignment of a student
were strengthened slightly. 232 The board now must grant the request in
the petition unless the board determines that "there is a reasonable basis
for denying the request. 12 33 As in prior law, the board's decision is final
unless an exception and appeal is filed based on denial of a right guaran-
teed under the U.S. Constitution.2 34
227. Id. § 29.201-29.203.
228. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 29.202 (Vernon 1996).
229. Id. § 29.203(c).
230. Id. § 29.203(b). The funds included in the grant do not include small district, spar-
sity, and cost of education adjustments or allotments for technology and transportation.
231. Id. § 28.003.
232. Compare id. 88 25.033, 25.034 with id. §8 21.077, 21.078 (Vernon 1987).




5. Human Sexuality Instruction
Parents also have more rights concerning human sexuality instruction.
Districts must make all curriculum materials used in human sexuality in-
struction available for reasonable public inspection and must notify par-
ents of the basic content of the district's instruction and of the parent's
right to remove the student from any part of the instruction. 235 Addition-
ally, instruction must emphasize abstinence, and condoms may not be dis-
tributed in connection with instruction related to human sexuality. 236
Districts must establish local health education advisory councils to advise
boards of trustees. 237
6. Right to Pray or Meditate
A newly codified student right is the "absolute right to individually,
voluntarily, and silently pray or meditate in school in a manner that does
not disrupt the instructional or other activities of the school. '238 A per-
son may not require, encourage, or coerce a student to engage in or re-
frain from prayer or meditation during a school activity. 239
7. Programs for Students Who are Deaf or Hard of Hearing
A new subchapter, concerning programs for students who are deaf or
hard of hearing, requires those students to have an education in which
their unique communication mode is respected, used, and developed. 240
Their teachers and others involved in their education must understand
the unique nature of their condition, and their teachers must be proficient
in appropriate language modes or use a certified interpreter.241 In deter-
mining appropriate programs, the parents and their advocates are in-
volved; other individuals may be involved at the parent's or district's
discretion.242
C. COURSES OF STUDY
Senate Bill 1 divides the required curriculum into two categories: the
foundation curriculum and the enrichment curriculum. 243 The founda-
tion curriculum consists of English language arts, mathematics, science,
and social studies, which are the subjects assessed in the state testing pro-
gram.24" The SBOE must publish for each subject of the foundation cur-
riculum the essential knowledge and skills that all students should be able
235. Id. § 28.004.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.901 (Vernon 1996).
239. Id.; see also Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
240. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 29.303 (Vernon 1996).
241. Id. § 29.304.
242. Id. § 29.306.
243. Id. § 28.002.
244. Id. § 28.002(a)(1).
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to demonstrate. 245 All school districts must provide instruction in the es-
sential knowledge and skills at appropriate grade levels for all courses in
the foundation curriculum. 246
Each school district also must offer courses in the enrichment curricu-
lum, which consists of other languages, health, physical education, fine
arts, economics, career and technology education, and technology appli-
cations.247 The SBOE publishes the essential knowledge and skills for
courses in the enrichment curriculum that school districts use as guide-
lines for instruction.248
The SBOE also identifies curriculum requirements for the minimum,
recommended, and advanced high school programs.249 A student is eligi-
ble to graduate and receive a diploma only if the student successfully
completes: (1) the curriculum requirements and the state-mandated as-
sessments; or (2) an individualized education program established for
special education students.250 School districts may issue a certificate of
coursework completion to students who meet the curriculum require-
ments but fail to satisfy the state assessment requirements. 251 A district
may also allow these students to participate in a graduation ceremony. 252
D. EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES
Perhaps the most famous of the 1984 education reforms was the "no-
pass, no-play" rule: a student who is not passing all classes cannot partici-
pate in extracurricular activities.253 Senate Bill 1 modified the rule after
legislators heard testimony that the six-week suspension caused many stu-
dents to turn to gangs rather than their studies. Under the new law, a
student who fails a course will be suspended from participating in any
University Interscholastic League or district-sponsored activity for three
weeks; however, the student may continue to practice or rehearse.254 The
district must review the student's grades each three weeks. 255 A suspen-
sion under no-pass, no-play may not be lifted until the student is perform-
ing satisfactorily in all courses. 256
245. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.002(c) (Vernon 1996).
246. Id.
247. Id. § 28.002(a)(2).
248. Id. § 28.002(d).
249. Id. § 28.025(a).
250. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.025(a) (Vernon 1996).
251. Id. § 28.025(c).
252. Id. § 28.025(b).
253. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.920 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
254. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 33.081 (Vernon 1996).





A. TEXTBOOKS AND TECHNOLOGY
The main problem with the prior textbook adoption process was the
lack of selection resulting from the state's one-size-fits-all approach.
First, the statute itself was restrictive. It limited the SBOE to adopting no
more than eight textbooks for each subject or course,257 and it required a
district to pick the same textbook for each campus258-even if different
campuses have different types of students and different needs. Second,
the SBOE process was overly prescriptive, which severely limited the
number of publishers submitting books and the number of books from
which districts could choose. In fact, from 1988 to 1994, publishers sub-
mitted only three science texts for consideration in Texas, while twenty-
two were submitted in California.259 Many Texas school districts re-
quested waivers from the commissioner to provide broader selection.260
Under Senate Bill 1, the SBOE will be able to provide a much broader
selection of textbooks. The SBOE adoption of a textbook is tied to the
state curriculum elements on which students are assessed. The SBOE
will adopt two lists of textbooks based on the SBOE's determination of
the extent to which the submitted textbook covers the essential knowl-
edge and skills of the subject. 261 The "conforming" list includes each sub-
mitted textbook that covers each element of the essential knowledge and
skills, meets applicable physical specifications, and is free of factual er-
rors.262 The "nonconforming" list includes each submitted textbook that
covers at least half but not all of the elements of the essential knowledge
and skills, meets applicable physical specifications, and is free of factual
errors.
263
An issue in interpretation is whether the SBOE may reject a book from
a list for another reason. A curriculum provision requires the SBOE and
each school district to "foster the continuation of the tradition of teaching
United States and Texas history and the free enterprise system ... in the
adoption of textbooks. '264 The same provision also says, "A primary
purpose of the public school curriculum is to prepare thoughtful, active
citizens who understand the importance of patriotism and can function
productively in a free enterprise society with appreciation for the basic
democratic values of our state and national heritage. '265 The question is
257. Id. § 12.14(b) (Vernon 1991).
258. Id. § 12.62 (Vernon 1991).
259. Kathy Walt, State's One for the Books, Publishers Say: Selling Texts to Texas Can
Be Risky Business, Hous. CHRON., July 3, 1994.
260. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.273(f) (Vernon Supp. 1995); see TEA Waiver Report
(1994). Although Senate Bill 1 removed limitations on the commissioner's authority to
waive textbook laws and rules, authority to waive the law does not mean the commissioner
must or will do so. See id. § 7.056 (Vernon 1996).
261. Id. § 31.023.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. § 28.002(h).
265. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 28.002(b) (Vernon 1996).
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whether the SBOE can reject a textbook that does not foster these no-
tions either through absence of mention or active hostility to them.
Once the SBOE adopts a textbook onto a list, the state pays for the
cost of a textbook selected by a district, up to a maximum amount set by
the SBOE.266 To allow more local selection, a school district may select a
book exceeding the price limit and pay the remainder of the cost.267 Ad-
ditional flexibility is allowed in that a district may select a book in the
enrichment curriculum that is not on either the conforming or noncon-
forming list, and the state will pay the lesser of 70 percent of the cost or
70 percent of the price limit.2 68 A lingering question is whether publish-
ers of these off-list books are subject to publisher duties and administra-
tive penalties.2 69 It appears they must hew to duties regarding sale price,
free items, quality, restraint of trade, and guarantee of delivery.270 Less
certain is whether the SBOE could exempt off-list publishers from depos-
itory requirements if, for example, districts bought the books at a book
store,271 and whether the publishers must file an affidavit of freedom
from factual errors if the off-list publisher does not contract with the
SBOE for purchase of an "adopted" textbook.2 72
As in prior law, the definition of "textbook" reflects the emergence of
technology-based instructional systems to include electronic media.2 73
Prior law's $30 per student technology allotment is now set aside from the
available school fund and sent to districts for purchasing and training in
electronic textbooks and purchasing and accessing learning-related tech-
nological equipment.2 74
B. SCHOOL BusEs
In the spirit of stripping non-educational mandates from the Education
Code, Senate Bill 1 removed a controversial and expensive requirement
that large bus fleets convert to alternative fuels.275 It repealed require-
ments that school districts purchase or sell school buses through the
state2 76 and that the commissioner approve school districts' bus routes.2 77
Senate Bill 1 also allows districts to use passenger cars to transport
fewer than ten students to or from school and in connection with school
266. Id. § 31.025.
267. Compare id. with id. § 12.251(b) (Vernon 1991).
268. Id. § 31.101(b) (Vernon 1996).
269. Id. § 31.151.
270. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 31.151 (Vernon 1996).
271. For purchases of $25,000 or more a district must contract by the method that pro-
vides the best value. Id. § 44.031.
272. Id. § 31.151(a)(8).
273. Id. § 31.002(3).
274. Id. § 31.021(b)(2). In addition, House Bill 2188 created the Texas Infrastructure
Fund which promotes technology for schools.
275. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.174 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
276. Id. §§ 21.161-21.162, 21.165, 21.167-21.169 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
277. Id. § 21.174(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1995). Senate Bill 1 also directs the Legislative
Budget Board to study the way the state funds transportation. See Acts 1995, 74th Leg.,
ch. 260, § 85(b).
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activities. 278 The definition of "passenger car" has been controversial, be-
cause of desires to provide school districts maximum flexibility and maxi-
mum protection. 279 The Texas Attorney General initially issued an
opinion with a restrictive definition of "passenger car," but later vacated
the opinion;280 the issue is still pending.
C. PURCHASING
Another area that has required Attorney General opinions is the new
purchasing law, which applies both to school districts and to junior col-
lege districts.281 Prior law required competitive bidding of contracts for
purchase of personal property valued at $25,000 or more in the aggregate
for each 12-month period.282 Senate Bill 1 allows more flexibility in the
ways districts determine to whom to award a contract but also expands
the kinds of contracts subject to the purchasing law. It requires that, with
a few exceptions, "all school district contracts" valued at $25,000 or more
in the aggregate for each 12-month period-not just those for purchase of
personal property-are subject to the purchasing law.283
Districts no longer are tied to only competitive bidding. They also can
use competitive sealed proposals, a request for proposals, a catalogue
purchase, an interlocal contract, or a design/build contract. 284 In deter-
mining to whom to award a contract, the district may consider the
purchase price, vendor's reputation, quality of the vendor's goods or serv-
ices, extent to which the goods or services meet the district's needs, ven-
dor's past relationship with the district, impact on compliance with laws
on historically underutilized businesses, long-term cost, and other rele-
vant factors.285
VI. SAFE SCHOOLS
School safety has been a growing concern in Texas, with much discus-
sion focused on ways to remove disruptive and violent students from the
classroom. At the same time, expelling those students helps neither the
society to which they are expelled nor the students themselves. These
concerns are addressed by giving teachers the authority to remove disrup-
tive students but providing methods by which these students are not ex-
pelled to the streets. For the most part, Senate Bill 1 eliminates the
278. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 34.003 (Vernon 1996).
279. See Letter from Jorge Vega, First Assistant Attorney General, to Mike Moses,
Commissioner of Education (September 8, 1995) (on file with the author).
280. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-362 (1995) (vacated Sept. 8, 1995).
281. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 130.084 (Vernon 1991).
282. Id. § 21.901 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
283. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 44.031 (Vernon 1996).
284. Id. § 44.031(a). It is debatable whether a district that chooses, for example, com-
petitive bidding must comply with the local Government Code provisions on competitive
bidding. See Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 271.024 (Vernon Supp. 1996) (government entity's
bidding must comply with competitive bidding statute if entity is required by statute to
award contract on the basis of competitive bids).
285. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 44.031(b) (Vernon 1996).
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traditional suspension and expulsion of students and requires removal to
an alternative setting.
Prior law had suffocating levels of due process and second guessing.286
A teacher who wanted to remove a discipline problem from the class-
room, for example, could be overruled by the principal, superintendent,
board of trustees, and court.287 Under Senate Bill 1, a teacher may re-
move a student from the classroom if the student's behavior is so unruly,
disruptive, or abusive as to seriously interfere with the ability of the stu-
dent's classmates to learn or the teacher to teach.288 Upon such removal,
the principal cannot require that the student be returned to the classroom
without the teacher's approval, unless a placement review committee-
two faculty-selected teachers and one principal designee 289-determines
that such placement is the best or only alternative.2 90 The principal may
place the student into another appropriate classroom, in-school suspen-
sion, or an alternative education setting.291
Each school district must provide a separated alternative education set-
ting to which students removed from class may be sent.2 92 A student
must be removed from class and placed in an alternative education set-
ting if the student commits on school property or at a school-related ac-
tivity an assault or terroristic threat, controlled substance or alcoholic
beverage offense, abusable glue or aerosol paint offense, public lewdness,
or indecent exposure. In addition, certain offenses that occur on or off
campus now require that a student be placed in an alternative education
program if the student engages in conduct punishable as a felony or en-
gages in the offense of retaliation against a school employee. 293
If a court has ordered a student to attend an alternative education pro-
gram as a condition of probation once during a school year and the stu-
dent is again referred to juvenile court during that school year, the
juvenile court may not again order the student to attend an alternative
education program without the district's consent, unless the county juve-
nile board has entered into a memorandum of understanding with the
school board.294
A student must be removed from school and referred to juvenile court
for adjudication if the student on school property or at a school-related
activity engages in conduct that contains the elements of aggravated as-
sault, sexual assault, weapons offenses, arson, murder, criminal attempt to
286. For a discussion of due process in public schools, see PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE
DEATH OF COMMON SENSE 127-128 & 158-161 (1994).
287. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.301(l), 21.3011 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1995).
288. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.002 (Vernon 1996).
289. Id. § 37.003.
290. Id. § 37.002.
291. Id.
292. Id. § 37.008.
293. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.006 (Vernon 1996). A student may be suspended for
up to three days for conduct for which the student could be placed in an alternative educa-
tion program. Id. § 37.005.
294. Id. § 37.010(d).
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commit murder, indecency with a child, aggravated kidnapping, or felony
assault or drug offenses. 295 A student who brings a firearm to school is
expelled from the student's regular school for at least one year consistent
with a federal requirement.296 A student may be expelled to the juvenile
justice system if the student continues to engage in serious or persistent
misbehavior after being placed in an alternative education program. 297 A
student also must be expelled if the student, on or off campus, engages in
certain serious conduct in retaliation against a district employee or en-
gages in felony criminal mischief.298
To ensure that expelled students continue to receive educational serv-
ices, juvenile boards of counties with a population greater than 125,000
must develop a juvenile justice alternative education program, subject to
approval by the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission.299 For each stu-
dent in a juvenile justice alternative, education program, the affected
school districts must send the juvenile board funds equal to the district's
average per student expenditure in alternative education programs. 300
For purposes of accountability and state funds, a student enrolled in a
juvenile justice program is reported as if the student were enrolled at the
student's regularly assigned campus. 30 1
Senate Bill 1 requires each school district to adopt a student code of
conduct with the advice of the district-level committee and jointly, "as
appropriate," with the local county juvenile board.302 The code of con-
duct specifies the circumstances for removal from a classroom, campus, or
alternative education program; specifies conditions authorizing or requir-
ing an administrator to transfer a student to an alternative education pro-
gram; and outlines conditions for suspension or expulsion. 30 3 The code of
conduct also must outline the juvenile board's responsibilities and define
conditions of payments from the district to the board.30 4
VII. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACCREDITATION
The methods of accrediting districts have historically been intrusive,
process-and-paper-driven regulation with the TEA making on-site visits
into classrooms, interviewing teachers, and looking at curriculum guides.
In 1993, Senate Bill 7 began a move to a more performance-based ac-
countability system that is refined by Senate Bill 1.
295. See id. §§ 37.007, 37.009(f), 37.010.
296. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2).
297. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.007(b) (Vernon 1996).
298. Id. § 37.007(c) & (f).
299. Id. § 37.011(a).
300. Id. § 37.012(a).
301. Id. § 37.011(h).
302. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.001(a) (Vernon 1996). "As appropriate" is ambigu-
ous: do the district and county boards come together on appropriate matters or do the






School districts are still required to be accredited by the TEA, but no
longer does funding depend on accreditation and compliance with pro-
cess goals such as class size and minimum salaries standards. 30 5 The
threat of pulling a district's funding-leaving students without an educa-
tion-simply was unrealistic. Accreditation, instead, is determined
mainly by: a district's performance on state assessment instruments, ag-
gregated by grade level and subject area; dropout rates; student attend-
ance rates; the percentage of graduating students whose scores on the
exit-level exam equal passing scores on the Texas college freshman exam;
the percentage of graduating students who meet course requirements for
the SBOE's recommended high school program; and the results of the
Scholastic Assessment Test and the American College Test.30 6 The
SBOE sets the performance levels, and the TEA reviews the perform-
ance of each district and campus and determines if an accreditation
change is warranted. 30 7
A. ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS
1. Assessments
The state assessment program emphasizes the foundation curriculum of
English language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies.308 Senate
Bill 1 requires that all students in grades 3-8 be assessed in reading and
mathematics, 30 9 that students in grades 4 and 8 be assessed in writing,310
and that social studies and science be assessed at an appropriate grade
level to be determined by the SBOE.311
The high school exit-level test in mathematics and English language
arts (including writing) will continue to be required for high school gradu-
ation.312 Senate Bill 1 also requires the implementation of four end-of-
course assessments not later than the 1998-99 school year: English II, Al-
gebra I, Biology I, and United States history.313 A student who performs
satisfactorily on both the English and algebra assessments and either the
biology or history exam will be exempted from the exit-level test.
3 14
305. Id. § 11.001. See also id. §§ 16.051-16.057 (Vernon 1991 & Supp. 1995).
306. Id. § 39.072(b) (Vernon 1996). Additionally, the SBOE may allow TEA to con-
sider compliance with statute and rules relating to data reporting, high school graduation
requirements, no-pass no-play, health and safety, purchasing laws, class-size limits, removal
of disruptive students from the classroom, at-risk programs, and pre-kindergarten pro-
grams, and may consider the effectiveness of the district's special education programs.
307. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 39.024, 39.051, 39.072, 39.073 (Vernon 1996).
308. Id. § 39.023(a).
309. Id. § 39.023(a)(1).
310. Id. § 39.023(a)(2).
311. Id. § 39.023(a)(3).
312. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.025(a) (Vernon 1996).
313. Id. § 39.023.




In December 1994, a district court in Harris County ordered the State
to allow parents to view the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills
(TAAS) test.315 The case currently is on appeal. The issue involves the
right of a parent to see confidential field test questions. The Legislature,
at the SBOE's request, now requires public disclosure of all test questions
upon which a student is graded at the end of each year.316 "Field test"
questions are not disclosed, to ensure a valid bank of questions each year,
but the questions will be disclosed once they are no longer being field-
tested.317
B. SANcrTIONS
If a school district or campus is not performing to state expectations,
the commissioner can step in with sanctions.318 A federal judge panel, in
Casias v. Moses,319 warned that some of the state's accountability sanc-
tions "could result in the replacement of the elected Board with the ap-
pointed management team. '3 20 Senate Bill 1 narrows the scope of the
functions that may be performed by a commissioner-appointed master or
management team (but, curiously, not by a board of managers) by
preventing them from taking any action concerning a district election,
changing the number and method of selecting trustees, setting a district
tax rate, or adopting or altering a budget for the school district. Senate
Bill 1 also limits the duration of the appointment of a master or manage-
ment team by requiring renewal every 90 days.321 Casias is on appeal.
The U.S. Department of Justice has taken the position that every action
of this nature by the commissioner needs Voting Rights Act
preclearance. 322
VIII. SCHOOL FINANCE
In January 1995, after four opinions and six years, the Texas Supreme
Court in Edgewood Independent School District v. Meno declared consti-
tutional "in all respects" the state school finance system that lets each
property-wealthy school district decide how to reduce its wealth per stu-
dent.323 The opinion focuses on the Legislature's duty to provide for "a
general diffusion of knowledge." Accreditation is the legislatively de-
fined level that achieves the constitutional mandate of a general diffusion
315. Maxwell v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 92017184 (295th Dist. Ct., Harris
County, Tex., Dec. 30, 1994).
316. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 26.005, 39.023(d) (Vernon 1996).
317. Id. § 39.023.
318. Id. § 39.131(a).
319. Civil Action No. SA-95-CA-0221 (W.D. Tx. May 11, 1995), at 8.
320. Id.
321. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.131(e) (Vernon 1996).
322. Patrick, supra note 67.
323. Edgewood IV, 893 S.W.2d at 484.
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of knowledge. 324 The accountability system meets this obligation, be-
cause only districts achieving the state's goals can receive an accredited
rating.325 Under the school finance system, children in property-rich and
property-poor districts now have substantially equal access to the funds
needed to meet accreditation requirements. Thus, the system is
constitutional.
The court also held that tax rate limits are not constitutionally re-
quired. 326 Once all districts are provided with sufficient revenue to sat-
isfy a general diffusion of knowledge, allowing districts to tax at a rate
above the statutory $1.50 limit creates no constitutional issue. 327 Senate
Bill 1 raises the tax limit; maintenance and operations taxes are now
capped at $1.50, and new debt service, defined as debt issued after Sep-
tember 1, 1992, is capped at $0.50.328
IX. CONCLUSION
Senate Bill 1 was an enormous advance toward local control. At its
heart is the accountability system. The state sets specific and measurable
goals, gives authority to those persons responsible for results, and meas-
ures and rewards results. Educators who desire more authority can use a
charter arrangement, which gives parents more voice and choice in their
children's education. Under the new Texas school law, citizens and par-
ents should be able to improve their education system by going through
the local level. With the Senate Bill 1 options and with greater authority
and citizen control at the local level, perhaps there will be less need in the
future for state school law.
324. Id. at 463.
325. Although Edgewood IV relied on the state's public education goals, Senate Bill 1
changed the goals section to "Public Education Mission and Objectives," which adds pa-
rental involvement and safe schools as objectives. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 4.001
(Vernon 1996). Senate Bill 1 also added "Public Education Academic Goals," which call
for students to demonstrate exemplary performance in reading and writing the English
language and in understanding mathematics, science, and social studies. Id. § 4.002.
326. Edgewood IV, 893 S.W.2d at 466.
327. Id.
328. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 41.002(d) (Vernon 1996).
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